Method at a glance

  • Modality: cardiac (typically auditory heart-rate feedback)
  • Measures: Whether the mere belief/perception that a bodily change has occurred — independent of actual afferent signals — influences emotional experience and appraisal.
  • Procedure: Participants hear (fake) heart-rate feedback that is manipulated to speed up, slow down, or change in response to stimuli, regardless of their actual heart rate; effects on stimulus ratings, preferences, or emotional salience are measured. fMRI variants track brain responses (e.g., AIC) to the false feedback.
  • Also called: false heart-rate feedback, bogus feedback, Valins paradigm, false cardiac feedback

Valins (1966), “Cognitive effects of false heart-rate feedback.” Participants’ beliefs about their own cardiac responses are manipulated with fabricated feedback; the question is whether believed bodily change alone shifts emotional evaluation.

Two readings that recur in the wiki

  • Friedman (2010) — the “apogee” of 1960s cognitive views: false-feedback effects implied actual ANS feedback was incidental to feeling (“primarily a result of cognitive factors and not physiological ones”). Friedman notes this is not irreconcilable with the Somatic marker hypothesis: somatosensory cortex may simulate bodily feedback (an “as-if” loop), making the effect physiological after all.
  • Seth (2013) — false feedback is predicted by Interoceptive inference: Gray et al. (2007) found false cardiac feedback increased right-AIC responses and the emotional salience attributed to previously unthreatening stimuli. In predictive-coding terms, injected (false) interoceptive evidence updates the generative model and thus the felt emotion — top-down and bottom-up are two directions of one loop, not “cognitive vs physiological.”

The same paradigm thus flips meaning depending on framework: evidence against the body’s role under 1960s cognitivism, evidence for an integrated predictive body-model under Seth. See inferential?.

The paradigm turned on a physiological variable (Iodice et al. 2019)

Every use above manipulates an emotional judgment — how salient, how attractive, how threatening a stimulus feels. Iodice et al. (2019) point the same tool at a homeostatic/effort variable, which is what makes it an interoception study rather than an emotion study, and the source of the Interoceptive illusion construct.

Cyclists heard synthesised heartbeat sounds they believed were their own; when the sound was faster than their real heart rate, the same physical work felt harder (RPE rose). Three controls the classic false-feedback studies never all ran together:

  • No entrainment: actual heart rate did not change with the feedback (BF = 0.014), so the raised effort is a misperception, not the heart obeying the sound.
  • The sound is inert: congruent feedback produced the same ratings as no feedback, so hearing a heartbeat does not bias reports — only incongruent feedback does.
  • Asymmetry: slower feedback did not lower perceived effort (Bayesian support for the null). This rules out stimulus-following, beat-counting and salience/attention accounts, all of which predict a symmetric effect, and points instead to a risk-averse prior that resists downward revision.

For this method page the lesson is that false feedback is not only a probe of appraisal but a probe of physiological estimation — a clean handle on Interoceptive inference that holds the body fixed and moves the percept. Note also that Iodice et al.’s a priori prediction — low interoceptive sensibility (MAIA) → stronger illusion, following Tsakiris’s RHI work — failed, so the paradigm’s individual-difference moderators remain open.