Adrenalin (epinephrine) injection paradigm
The paradigm at the historical center of cognitive-appraisal theory. By injecting adrenalin to create bodily arousal without an emotional eliciting event, experimenters could ask whether arousal alone constitutes emotion — a direct probe of the James–Lange premise.
Historical arc (Friedman + Dror)
- Marañón (1924): adrenalin injections yielded mostly “cold” or “as-if” emotion in predisposed patients — arousal without a precipitating cause rarely produced genuine felt emotion. The single source Schachter & Singer actually cited in their original manuscript (see dror-2017-two-factors).
- Cantril & Hunt (1932); Landis & Hunt (1932): English-language adrenalin-injection studies testing James–Lange — added to Schachter–Singer only at a reviewer’s request.
- Schachter & Singer (1962): the definitive form — epinephrine × (informed/uninformed/misinformed) × (euphoric/angry confederate). Uninformed subjects “caught” the confederate’s emotion; informed subjects (who could attribute arousal to the drug) did not → arousal + cognitive label = emotion. See stanley-schachter, friedman-2010-jamesian-perspective.
- Schachter–Wheeler (1962): added chlorpromazine (sympathetic blocker) and replaced the stooge with a funny movie — showing any cognition, not social contagion, explains arousal.
Three verdicts in the wiki
- Friedman: the paradigm’s physiological assumptions were naïve; it wrongly cemented “undifferentiated arousal” against autonomic-specificity.
- Dror: the paradigm was, historically, a vehicle for a social-influence research program, later reframed as a physiological/James–Lange story. See origins-of-two-factor-theory.
- Quigley et al. (2021): the interoception field’s own verdict, delivered in passing and from outside the emotion-history literature. Quigley, Kanoski, Grill, Barrett & Tsakiris (2021) cite Schachter & Singer (1962) as the exemplar of “early work [that] used physiological manipulations to alter interoceptive signaling and thereby affect,” and report that “on the whole this work has been difficult to replicate, likely due to the crucial additional role of the external context” (citing Mezzacappa 1999, “Epinephrine, arousal, and emotion: a new look at two-factor theory”).
The third verdict is worth keeping separate from the first two, because it is doing different work. Friedman and Dror are arguing about what the paradigm meant; Quigley et al. are noting what it cost. Their point is methodological: these studies “illustrate how difficult it is, with current interoceptive methods in humans, to study the specific impact of interoceptive signals on affective and emotional experience.” The most direct causal handle the field ever had on the body→feeling link did not hold, and nothing replaced it — which is the argument they use to motivate affective-touch as a new manipulable channel.
Note also the confound they name in the same passage, which this paradigm is the purest instance of: many designs “blurred the important distinction between what participants believe or expect about their bodily changes versus actual changes in interoceptive signaling.” The informed/uninformed/misinformed manipulation is a belief manipulation layered on an arousal manipulation — see false-feedback-paradigm, where belief is the whole of it.