Jakob Hohwy

The philosopher of the predictive-processing framework — named on the predictive-coding page from the first ingest as one of its founders (with Clark and Friston), and read first-hand at last through Parr et al. (2019). The Predictive Mind (2013) is the book-length argument that a single idea — the brain as a hierarchical Bayesian model minimising prediction error — can carry perception, attention, agency and the sense of a unified self.

Self-evidencing

His most portable contribution to this wiki is self-evidencing (Hohwy 2016): the claim that minimising free energy just is gathering evidence for one’s own generative model — “the self-evidencing brain.” It supplies the motivational floor under active-inference: an agent acts to make its sensations conform to the model that predicts its continued existence. This is the philosophical version of the “agents stay alive by predicting the states that keep them alive” slogan the wiki’s computational sources use, and it is why the 2019 paper can treat a fading or flipping percept as an agent failing, or succeeding, to evidence its hypotheses about a scene.

His relevance here is the framework, not the organ

Hohwy is a philosopher of mind, not an interoception researcher; he reaches this wiki because the interoceptive-inference programme (Seth, Barrett) is a special case of the predictive-processing picture he articulates. His “distrusting the present” idea (with the volatility prior that lets uncertainty accumulate) is the exact assumption that drives Troxler fading in Parr et al. Thin page: one paper in raw/.